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Labor regulations 
influence the level and 
flexibility of wages and 
can diminish new workers’
chances of finding jobs 
by pushing up 
employment costs.
When it comes to unemployment and labor force participation rates,
immigrants do better in the United States than in most other countries.1 In 2005, for
example, the foreign-born had average unemployment of 4.6 percent in the U.S.,
well below native-born workers’ 5.2 percent. U.S. immigrants also had higher par-
ticipation rates. The American experience stands in stark contrast to many other
developed nations’. In France and Germany, for example, the foreign-born typically
have jobless rates twice as high as native-born workers and lower participation rates. 
What accounts for these differences? Most studies attribute poor labor mar-
ket outcomes to the immigrants themselves—their education levels, language skills,
inexperience, family composition and reasons for migrating. Immigrant characteris-
tics surely matter, but so do the host country’s labor market institutions and policies.2
Countries with less restrictive
labor regulations typically provide
more job opportunities for their immi-
grants. Employers have greater free-
dom in hiring and firing, and supply
and demand largely determines the
terms of employment, such as wages,
benefits and length of the workweek.
More restrictive policies, on the other
hand, include centralized wage-setting,
strict rules that inhibit laying off work-
ers and ceilings on the length of the
workweek, such as the 35-hour limit
France imposed in 2000. 
Labor regulations influence the
level and flexibility of wages and can
diminish new workers’ chances of
finding jobs by pushing up employ-
ment costs. In standard economic
analysis, unemployment results when
wages and benefits exceed the market
rate. It can happen when wage floors
and mandated benefits set compensa-
tion too high. It can also occur when
compensation is fixed and cannot fall
in response to increased supply or
decreased demand for labor. 
Studies suggest less productive
and lower wage workers are more
likely than others to find themselves
without jobs when restrictive policies
are adopted or when wages remain
fixed in the face of an adverse eco-
nomic shock. A 2002 study of 17
countries in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) found that union wage-
setting priced the young and elderly
out of employment and pushed them
out of the labor force, while it raised
relative unemployment rates for
females.2
There’s little research on such
regulations’ effect on immigrants, but
the issue is coming to the forefront.
The OECD has preliminary work
showing that higher minimum wages,
generous unemployment benefits and
higher taxes negatively affect labor
market activity among foreign-born
women and employment among for-
eign-born men.3 Immigrants are often
more vulnerable than natives because
in addition to lower education levels,
they are typically younger and lack
host-country language skills and job
experience.4
Labor market access is important
because immigrants who can’t find
work are blocked from the first rungs
of the economic ladder. In more flexi-
ble labor markets, employers can
compensate for immigrants’ initial lia-
bilities by offering them lower starting
wages—in much the same way busi-
nesses pay fresh college graduates less
than experienced workers. Over time,
as immigrants improve their skills and
become more productive, they earn
higher pay. In fact, studies of U.S.
immigrants find that lower initial earn-
ings are correlated with subsequent
higher wage growth.5
Immigrants have a large and
growing presence in many national
economies. They make up 23.6 per-
cent of the population in Australia,
18.8 percent in Canada, 12.1 percent
in the U.S. and Germany, and 10 per-
cent in France (Table 1). Policies that
erect employment barriers can lead to
unemployment, inactivity or segment-
ed labor markets that relegate immi-
grants to temporary jobs or positions
with few prospects for advancement.
Better job opportunities for immi-
grants, on the other hand, can speed
their economic assimilation and




Labor market policies regulate
what would otherwise be a private
transaction—the buying and selling of
labor. Examples include centralized
wage-setting, job protection, minimum
annual leave and employment taxes.
Regulations may also require safe
working conditions and prohibit dis-
crimination based on age, gender and
race. The level and duration of unem-
ployment benefits and the generosity
of social assistance programs can also
influence labor supply. Although gov-
ernments typically set labor market
policies, collective bargaining between
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NOTE: Data are for 2001 except as follows:
Australia (2004); Denmark, the Netherlands
(2003); U.S. (2005); Germany, Ireland and
Sweden (2002); France (1999).
SOURCES: Migration Policy Institute;
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (denoted by *).3
workers’ and employers’ unions also
plays a large role in many countries.
Every nation intervenes in its
labor market to some extent. The
International Institute for Management
Development (IMD) produces annual
surveys that compare the degree of
labor market regulation among coun-
tries. Scores are based on question-
naires sent to top and middle man-
agers of businesses in the 60
economies covered in the IMD World
Competitiveness Yearbook. Respondents
assess the competitiveness of their
labor markets, assigning lower values
when they think regulations hinder
business and higher ones when they
see few problems. The IMD then cal-
culates an average value for each
economy.
The scores range from zero for
countries with regulations that present
the greatest hindrance to business to 10
for nations with policies that cause the
least. According to the IMD, France and
Germany have the most regulated labor
markets in our sample of OECD coun-
tries. The least-regulated labor markets
include Denmark, the U.S. and Canada
(Table 2). 
By plotting each country’s IMD
score against the difference in jobless
rates between foreign- and native-born
men in the countries with data avail-
able, we can see how the degree of
labor market regulation correlates with
immigrants’ relative unemployment rate.
The unemployment rates, which come
from the 2005 OECD report Trends in
International Migration, represent the
average for foreign-born and native
men ages 15 to 64 in 2003.6
Immigrants in countries with
more restrictive labor regulations have
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Male unemployment rates 
Native       Foreign-born
IMD score         Country                 (percent)        (percent)
2.3 France 7.3 15.4
2.4 Germany 9.3 16.9
2.7 Belgium 6.0 18.3
3.3 Spain 7.9 10.4
3.5 Greece 5.8 6.5
3.7 Netherlands 2.8 9.1
3.8 Sweden 5.2 12.7
3.9 Italy 7.0 3.8
4.2 Australia 6.0 6.5
4.7 Czech Republic 5.8 9.0
5.0 Ireland 4.8 6.6
5.0 United Kingdom 5.2 8.1
5.3 Austria 4.4 9.7
6.5 Canada 6.2 7.3
6.6 United States 7.0 7.2
7.6 Denmark 3.8 8.8
NOTES: Higher IMD scores reflect fewer regulations. IMD scores are for
2004; unemployment rates, for 2003.
SOURCES: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2005;Trends in




























Most regulated Least regulated
IMD score
Chart 1
Immigrants Fare Better in 
Less Restrictive Labor Markets
Difference between immigrant and native 
unemployment rates
Percentage point difference
SOURCES: Trends in International Migration: SOPEMI 2004 Edition; IMD World Competitiveness
Yearbook, 2005.
higher unemployment rates relative to
natives than immigrants in countries
with fewer such regulations (Chart 1).
In France, for example, male immi-
grants had a jobless rate of 15.4 per-
cent, while natives were at 7.3 per-
cent—a gap of 8.1 percentage points,
second only to Belgium’s 12.3 points.
With an IMD score of 6.6, the U.S. is
less regulated and has a relatively
small difference in unemployment
rates—7.2 percent for male immigrants
and 7 percent for natives. The trend
line shows the overall tendency for
unemployment differentials to be
higher in more-regulated markets. In
most European countries, these differ-
ences are even larger when we com-
pare only immigrants from non-
European Union countries to natives.
Some outliers are far off the trend
line. Despite restrictive labor markets,
Table 2
Labor Market Regulation and
Unemploymentfor example, immigrants in southern
European countries such as Spain,
Greece and Italy fare quite well. Until
recently, immigrants to these countries
were few but relatively skilled, com-
pared with natives. Today, the
Mediterranean countries have higher
shares of employment-based immigra-
tion—including illegal immigration—
and larger informal sectors than north-
ern European countries. In Spain,
moreover, opportunities for immi-
grants have been facilitated by rapid
employment growth and a dual labor
market structure.7 The prevalence of
fixed-term employment contracts,
which bypass many regulations that
apply to permanent positions, has
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meant that temporary workers make
up a third of the Spanish workforce. 
Denmark is another outlier, but in
the opposite direction. Given the
country’s high IMD score, Danish
immigrants should fare better than
they do. Denmark, however, has very
generous social assistance and unem-
ployment benefits for low-income
workers, which at least partly explains
immigrants’ underperformance. 
Denmark’s net replacement rate—
the after-tax share of previous earnings
paid by unemployment benefits upon
job loss—is almost 80 percent for four
years for a one-earner family making
the equivalent of the average produc-
tion wage.8 In this case, the U.S. net
Table 3





Native       Foreign-born
IMD score         Country                (percent)        (percent)
2.3 France 69.8 64.4
2.4 Germany 71.3 64.1
2.7 Belgium 68.5 57.2
3.3 Spain 72.8 78.7
3.5 Greece 71.7 84.0
3.7 Netherlands 83.1 68.4
3.8 Sweden 76.5 64.6
3.9 Italy 69.2 86.4
4.2 Australia 78.7 74.1
4.7 Czech Republic 73.4 68.0
5.0 Ireland 74.7 72.6
5.0 United Kingdom 78.5 72.2
5.3 Austria 75.3 75.6
6.2 Hungary 63.4 74.8
6.5 Canada 79.1 77.2
6.6 United States 73.5 79.2
6.9 Slovak Republic 63.5 63.0
7.6 Denmark 79.4 58.2
NOTES: IMD scores are for 2004; ratios, for 2003.
SOURCES: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2005;Trends in
International Migration: SOPEMI 2004 Edition.
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Immigrant Economic Activity Greater in 
Less Restrictive Labor Markets
Difference between immigrant and native male
employment-to-population ratios
Percentage point difference
SOURCES: Trends in International Migration: SOPEMI 2004 Edition; IMD World Competitiveness
Yearbook, 2005.
Studies show that young
workers, as lower-
productivity employees,
often bear the costs 
of labor market 
regulations.replacement rate averages 55 percent
for 26 weeks. Compared with natives,
Danish immigrants are two to three
times more likely to receive unemploy-
ment benefits or social assistance.
Generous, long-lasting benefits
and assistance may lessen incentives
to find work, increase both the inci-
dence and duration of unemployment,
and discourage people from joining
the workforce. Because immigrants,
particularly those from non-EU coun-
tries, face other challenges and are
generally poorer, they’re more affected




Unemployment rates tell us about
workers who are actively seeking jobs.
If immigrants are discouraged from
even searching, they may remain out-
side the labor force altogether.
Looking at the number of immigrants
employed relative to their population
provides a broader measure of immi-
grants’ participation.
Among the countries with data
available, the employment-to-popula-
tion ratios of native- and foreign-born
men differ markedly (Table 3). In 2003
in France, 69.8 percent of native men
worked, compared with 64.4 percent
of foreign-born men—a difference of
5.4 percentage points. Belgium, the
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark
had differentials exceeding 10 percent-
age points. In the U.S., 73.5 percent of
native males held jobs, compared with
79.2 percent of male immigrants, a
gap of 5.7 percentage points in the
opposite direction. Overall, countries
with heavier labor regulation have a
smaller percentage of their foreign-
born male population employed than
countries with fewer regulations
(Chart 2).9
Labor market regulations aren’t
the only obstacle to foreign-born
workers’ employment. As mentioned
above, public assistance programs and
other social policies provide immi-
grants with an income and other sub-
sidies. These programs may deliberate-
ly or inadvertently keep would-be
workers out of the labor force. In
addition, immigration laws, such as
those applying to asylum seekers,
often prohibit work outright.
Undocumented immigrants aren’t
allowed to work, although in the U.S.
and many other countries they typical-
ly do. Illegal immigrants, particularly
men, have very high employment-to-
population ratios.10
Are the Young 
Disproportionately Hurt?
Studies show that young workers,
as lower-productivity employees, often
bear the costs of labor market regula-
tions, while prime-age, full-time work-
ers reap many of the benefits. Do
these regulations more heavily impact
young immigrants, who possess rela-
tively few skills and little work experi-
ence? 
In many countries, youth unem-
ployment is generally high, but immi-
grants tend to fare worse than natives
(Table 4). Among workers aged 15 to
24 in the countries with data available,
the average unemployment rates in
2002–03 for foreign citizens, including
men and women, were 5.3 percentage
points higher than they were for
nationals.11 This compares with a 3.8
percentage point differential for the
overall male population. 
Plotting individual countries’ dif-
ferentials against the IMD scores sug-
gests that nations with more-regulated
labor markets tend to disadvantage
young, non-native workers (Chart 3).
The trend line for youths is steeper
than the one for males overall.12 This
indicates labor market regulations may
affect young immigrants more than
older ones.
In France, the unemployment rate
for foreign youths was 34.2 percent in
2002–03, or 16.4 percentage points
higher than national youths’ unem-
ployment of 17.8 percent. Only
Belgium’s differential is higher. The
United States and most other less-
regulated nations tend to have lower
differentials between immigrants and
the native-born. Young U.S. immi-
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Generous, long-lasting
unemployment benefits
and social assistance may
lessen incentives to find
work, increase both the
incidence and duration of
unemployment, and 
discourage people from
joining the workforce.Many factors beyond family back-
ground contribute to academic suc-
cess, and immigrant students can be
disadvantaged in myriad ways—from a
lack of language skills to poor school
quality in urban areas. Parents’ labor
market outcomes can also play a role
by affecting the family’s economic
standing and the resources that are
devoted to children’s education.
Students’ perceptions of their own job
prospects will also contribute to how




Our data suggest a clear link
between labor market policies and
immigrants’ job prospects. Immigrants
in countries with highly regulated
labor markets have relatively high
unemployment rates and low employ-
ment-to-population ratios. Highly reg-
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grants actually had a lower unemploy-
ment rate than natives—10.7 percent
versus 12.5 percent. 
Some policymakers have recog-
nized that institutions are playing a
role in high youth unemployment
rates. France recently proposed
reforms to make labor markets more
flexible. The effort involved changes
in the law that would allow firms to
dismiss workers 26 years and younger
during the first two years of their
employment without having to give a
reason. The intention was to encour-
age the hiring of younger French
workers and reduce their unemploy-
ment rate. The virulent public
response included protests by college-
age youths, and the proposal was
quickly shelved. Students and workers
strongly resisted the removal of regu-
lations they believe guarantee their job 
security.
Another concern is how poor
labor market performance relates to
foreign youths’ educational outcomes.
Results from international testing of
foreign- and native-born 15-year-olds
suggest that achievement deficits of
foreign-born students are the most
severe in the countries where immi-
grant labor market outcomes are the
worst (Table 5). To measure achieve-
ment gaps, we used the average score
difference between natives and immi-
grants on math literacy tests in the
2003 Program for International Student
Assessment (PISA) for the countries in
our sample.13 U.S. students scored
below the international average over-
all, but the achievement gap between
natives and immigrants is relatively
small. Generally, the gaps shrink
when controlling for parents’ socio-
economic status, including education
level and occupational status, but they
remain large and significant in almost
every country. 
Table 4
Labor Market Regulation and
Youth Unemployment
Youth unemployment rate    
Nationals       Foreigners
IMD score         Country                (percent)        (percent)
2.3 France 17.8 34.2
2.4 Germany 10.0 16.3
2.7 Belgium 17.1 35.9
3.3 Spain 22.6 22.2
3.5 Greece 25.0 20.3
3.8 Sweden 13.1 26.8
4.2 Australia 12.8 17.0
4.7 Czech Republic 15.5 15.4
5.0 United Kingdom 10.5 14.8
5.3 Austria 7.1 9.7
6.5 Canada 9.7 14.3
6.6 United States 12.5 10.7
NOTES: Youth unemployment data refer to nationals and foreigners,
except for the United States, Canada and Australia, where data are
based on country of birth. IMD scores are for 2004; unemployment, for
2002–03.
SOURCES: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2005,Trends in
International Migration: SOPEMI 2004 Edition.
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Immigrant Youths Fare Better 
in Less Restrictive Labor Markets
Difference between foreign and national 
youth unemployment rates
Percentage point difference
SOURCES: Trends in International Migration: SOPEMI 2004 Edition; IMD World Competitiveness
Yearbook, 2005ulated labor markets with union-set
wages and high tax rates can price
newcomers and other less productive
workers out of jobs. 
Our analysis, however, by no
means quantifies the size of the effect,
nor does it explain all the differences
in labor market outcomes between
immigrants and natives. Indeed, many
factors account for the relative per-
formance of foreign workers across
countries. We’ve touched on the influ-
ences of unemployment benefits,
social assistance programs and dual
labor markets. But systematic differ-
ences in the characteristics of immi-
grants across countries also underlie
data patterns. 
Immigrant characteristics can
lessen or exacerbate the impact of
labor market policies. Educated and
high-productivity immigrants won’t be
as hurt by regulations that raise
employment costs. Despite a fairly
restrictive labor market, Australian
immigrants do well relative to the
native-born; the difference in unem-
ployment rates between the two
groups is close to zero. This is partly
explained by immigrants’ high educa-
tion levels. In Australia, 57 percent of
the foreign-born population has an
upper-level education, compared with
44 percent of the native population.14
In France, 63.9 percent of for-
eigners have less than a secondary
education, compared with 33.5 per-
cent for nationals. In Germany, 47.1
percent of foreigners lack secondary
schooling, while only 13.6 percent of
nationals do. The OECD found that if
foreigners in Germany had the same
education levels as nationals, the
unemployment gap would narrow by
a third. Education’s effect on the
unemployment gap was considerably
lower in other countries, however. 
Immigrant characteristics that
underlie economic outcomes are often
driven by geographic, historical, polit-
ical and cultural links between coun-
tries. For example, Mexicans make up
nearly a third of the U.S. foreign-born
population, largely due to their home-
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land’s proximity to the United
States. Historical ties with
North Africa help explain
why about a third of France’s
immigrants come from
Morocco and Algeria. 
Immigration laws and
other public policies also
matter. Countries like
Sweden, which give priority
to refugees and asylum seek-
ers, may have immigrant pop-
ulations that have worse eco-
nomic outcomes in the near
to medium term than coun-
tries like Canada and
Australia, which focus policy




may result in self-selection of
migrants, attracting those less
likely to do well in the labor
market.
Large numbers of immi-
grants without legal status—as
in the United States, where
about 30 percent of the for-
eign-born are undocument-
ed—may contribute to low
unemployment and high par-
ticipation rates. Undocumented
immigrants tend to migrate for work
and send money back home. Once
they’re in the host country, they have
strong incentives to continue working.
Illegal immigrants lack a social safety
net because they’re generally ineligible
for welfare and unemployment bene-
fits.15
Countries that restrict legal immi-
grants’ access to citizenship, as
Germany has historically done, may
inadvertently slow the assimilation
process.16 Research on U.S. immigrants
finds a positive association between
naturalization, higher income and flu-
ency in English.
Balancing Costs and Benefits
Although the determinants of
immigrants’ success are many and
complex, we can’t ignore the role of
labor market rigidities and their impli-
cations for the economy and society.
Policies that keep immigrants out of
employment contribute to higher
unemployment and lower economic
activity as well as slower economic
assimilation. These regulations are
often accompanied by extensive pub-
lic assistance programs, which
increase the tax burden associated
with immigration. Such side effects
can harden natives’ attitudes toward
immigrants. A report summarizing the
difference between European and U.S.
views found that a majority of
Europeans favor stopping migration
altogether, while a majority of
Americans want to merely stop
increases in migration.17
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United States 35 –1.8
Canada 10 4.6
Australia 7 4.2
NOTES: The achievement deficit has been adjusted for parents’
socioeconomic status. Youth unemployment is from Table 4.
SOURCES: “Variation in the Relationship Between Nonschool
Factors and Student Achievement on International
Assessments,” by Gillian Hampden-Thompson, Jamie Johnston
and American Institute for Research, Statistics in Brief, April
2006, National Center for Education Statistics; Trends in
International Migration: SOPEMI 2004 Edition.increases economic growth and
national income. The distribution of
the gains can be uneven, depending
on whether immigrants are low or
high skilled—but on average, the host
country benefits. Policies that restrict
labor market access, however, detract
from these gains. European labor
economists have shown that when the
host country is experiencing unem-
ployment and wages are fixed, immi-
gration of less-skilled workers results
in a net loss to natives.18
At a time when population and
labor force growth in many developed
countries are increasingly driven by
immigration, more attention should be
paid to the perverse effects of some
labor market policies. Nations should
seek to structure a level playing field,
on which the benefits of employment
protections and other regulations are
balanced against the costs, particularly
where many of these costs are borne
by the low-paid, low-skilled and inex-
perienced.  
Orrenius is a senior economist and Solomon
an economic analyst in the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas.
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